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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a theory of capital movements in thepresence of
potential expropriation. The threat of expropriation is derived fromutility
maximizing behavior by host countries. Potential investors, anticipating
this behavior, modify their investment plans to avoidexpropriation. .Yhen—
ever the host country faces competitive foreign investors expropriation
represents part of a time—consistent but suboptitnal plan of the type discussed
by Kydland and Prescott (1977). The consequent equilibrium may be character-
ized by a number of distortions.
In the simplest model we analyse, a host country faces a large number
of potential, competitive foreign investors. We explore theimplications of
the threat of expropriation for shadow pricing in the hostcountry and for
the optimal technology choice by potential investors. We consider variants.
of the model in which the potential investor is in a monopoly position vis—a—
vis the host country, in which the foreign investment project is subject to
risk which is unresolved at the time of the expropriation decision, and in
which factors affecting the optimality of expropriation by the hostcountry
are unresolved at the time of the investment decision.
The larger the penalty incumbent on the host country in the event of
expropriation, the greater its welfare in the simple, competitive model.
When the foreign investor is a monopolist, however, this result is reversed.
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Many factors prevent commodity trade from equalizing the rewards to
-factors of production in different countries, providing an incentive for
factor movements between countries. While movements of factors,especially
capital, are important in the world economy, they have not been sufficient
to equate factor returns among countries.
The failure of capital flows to equate rates of return on capital is
frequently attributed to political risks and left outside the sphere of
economic analysis. Specifically, investments abroad, especially in LDC's,
are said to bemoresubject to the risk of expropriation, or at least to
unpredictable changes in the tax and exchange control regime offered by the
host country. Williams (1975) estimates that about twenty percent of the
value of foreign investments carried into or made during 1956—72 in LDC's
was expropriated without compensation in this period. Rather than consigning
the study of these phenomena to other disciplines, we argue that an important
set of economic considerations affect the nature of these impediments to
capital mobility.
In this paper, we provide a theory of expropriation based on maximizing
behavior by investors and host countries. This theory can be used to identify
industry and national characteristics that increase the threat of expropria-
tion and imply large deviations from equalized rates of return on capital)
We examine host country and parent country policies minimizing the distortions
associated with the threat of expropriation.
Three broad conclusions follow from the analysis. First, the threat
of expropriation implies significant distortions in the international allo—
cation of capital even though the act of expropriation mayberelatively—2—
rare. For instance, in a world of perfect foresight and rational decision—
making, acts of expropriation would never occur and yet the actions by
investors taken to ensure that countries do not expropriate are distorting.
Second, the ability of governments to expropriate foreign investments
may actually reduce their own welfare. Further, the hosts may be better
off if investor country governments can retaliate against expropriating
countries. Indeed, the higher this penalty, the more their welfare may be
increased. This conclusion arises because a government's power to expro-
priate after investments are made leads investors to restrict their invest-
ments beforehand in a way that makes the host country worse off than it
would be if it could not expropriate, yielding an example of the general
paradox of time inconsistency (Kydlarid and Prescott, 1977).
Third, domestic factor prices may not accurately reflect social returns
when the threat of expropriation affects the supply of foreign investment.
The social rate of return on capital may exceed its domestic marginal product
while the social rate of return on any factor supplied by foreigners and
not expropriable may be less than the marginal product of that factor. This
result has implications for project evaluation in LDC's.
In Section 2 we present a simple model of foreign investment with
potential expropriation based on MacDougall's (1958) work on foreign invest-
ment in the absence of expropriation. A small country produces a single
output with three factors. Labor is supplied domestically in a fixed amount
and is not internationally mobile. Two other factors, capital and management,
are internationally mobile. These two factors diffei in that capital can be
expropriated; management cannot be. For our purposes, capital represents the
tangible aspects of foreign investment: plant, equipment, inventories and—3--
other properties left behind after expropriation. Managerial services are
the intangible assets that a foreign investor brings to the production
process: technical knowledge, organizational capabilities, access to over-
seas markets and the like. Essential to our analysis is the assumption that
if expropriation occurs, the managerial services of the foreign investor are
no longer available and cannot be replaced by other foreigners. This
situation may arise because foreign managers boycott the expropriating
country or because the capital installed by foreign investors is specific
to its ownmanagerialskills. Ex post the firm's managers may have a unique
ability to operate that firm's capital.
In deciding on expropriation, a host country must weigh the benefits
of obtaining income from foreign capital and the ownership of the capital
itself against the costs of losing access to foreign managerial services.
For many levels of foreign investment, including the one equating the
domestic marginal product of capital to the world interest rate, the benefits
of expropriation may outweigh the costs. Foreign investors will not increase
their investments to the point where expropriation becomes optimal. If the
threat of expropriation is binding, the level of foreign investment and
national income will be determined by competition among investors and the
capacity of the host country to absorb foreign investment without expropri-
ation. In Section 2 we examine the determinants of this equilibrium and the
effects of changes in .national factor endowments and world factor prices on
this equilibrium. We also investigate the effects of the threat of
expropriation on the distribution of income among national factors. Section
3 examines the associated consequences of the threat of expropriation for
project evaluation and optimal investment decisions in host countries.In Section 4 we consider the case of a foreign investor who is a mono-
polist vis—a—vis a number of potential host countries. The monopolistic
investor will always invest less than competitive investors for a given
technology. National income will also be lower.
Section 5 examines the consequences of expropriation for technical
choice. We show that when a parameter of the production function (e.g., the
elasticity of substitution) is a choice variable for the investors, investors
may distort the technology to reduce the threat of expropriation. Because
of this type of distortion, the threat of expropriation may raise the equi-
librium level of investment above the level obtaining under perfect capital
mobility. Furthermore, the monopolistic investor may actually invest more
than competitive investors, but the host country is still worse off than if
the foreign investors were competitive.
In Section 6 we return to the assumption that investors are competitive
but assume that projects are risky and that expropriation transfers this risk
to the host country. Risk bearing rather than managerial skill is the
contribution of foreign investors that cannot be expropriated. A host can
benefit from increases in the riskiness of projects if it is risk averse
while foreign investors are not, since risk reduces the threat of expropriation.
In Section 6 we assume that the risk inherent in foreign investment is
not resolved until after the expropriation decision must be made. This
assumption is appropriate to projects where the risk is ongoing, e.g.,
agricultural projects subject to annual differences in weather or projects
producing output sold in volatile international markets. For other types of
projects, uncertainty is resolved before the expropriation decision must be
made. This situation may prevail in extractive activity where a mineral
discovery resolves the uncertainty before production begins. In Section 7—5—
weassumethat the national endowment of managerial services is a random
variable revealed after the investment decision has been made but before
the host country decides on expropriation. In this model expropriations
can actually occur, in contrast with our previous models. Foreign investors
act knowing of this risk.
Our model applies specifically to capital movements in the form of
direct investment. The host country imports not only foreign capital but
foreign entrepreneurship as well, either in the form of managerial services
or risk bearing. The penalty of expropriation is the loss of this entre-
preneurship. Our model does not incorporate indirect investment since there
is no mechanism to insure repayment.
Capital movements in the form of portfolio investment have, however,
become increasingly important to less developed countries. Implicit in this
form of lending is a set of penalties for nonrepayment other than the ones
we consider here. An important penalty may be exclusion from future parti-
cipation in international capital markets. Elsewhere (Eaton and Gersovitz,
1981) we analyze financial market equilibrium in which the penalty of default
is loss of future ability to borrow.
We could have incorporated similar considerations into the current
analysis. For simplicity, however, we focus on a single period of what is
a repeated process in the relationship between a host country and foreign
investors. In contrast with our earlier work we do not consider explicitly
the effect of an expropriation on the host country's ability to attract
foreign capital in the future. This exclusion is justified if the host
country has a high discount rate or if it cannot acquire a reputation,
perhaps because its government changes frequently. Alternatively, we canincorporate the loss of future investment suffered by an expropriation
into a general penalty consequent upon expropriation, the effects of which
we do analyze here.
Our mode]. does assume, however, that investors act to protect their
reputations in punishing expropriation: as a consequence of expropriation
firms withdraw their managerial services or impose other penalties, such as
an embargo on future investment in the country, An assumption of this sort
is essential for the existence of an equilibrium with any capital movement
at all. If investors cannot develop a reputation for punishing expropriators
they have no incentive, ex post, to impose a penalty. 1-lost countries would
always expropriate, so that potential investors would never invest abroad.—7—
2.A Simple Model of Foreign Investment with Potential Expropriation
Consider an economy rroducing a single output (Q) using inputs of




<0 .Theproduction function PC )exhibitsconstant returns
toscale. The endowments of each factor possessed by the country are: L
K and Ii .Lt thetime of foreign investment, capital and managers are
completely robile between countries while workers are entirely immobile.
Thus L =Lwhile K and H exceed K and H by the amounts of foreign
investmcnt in capital and foreign transfer of managerial skills respectively.
e focus only on situations in which K >Kand H >H.IfK <K
theeconomy we consider is a capital exporter, so thatitsexpropriation of
foreign capital is not anissue.2 If K > while H <iithe host country
has nothing to lose from expropriation, since it is not importing foreign
managers. In this case the host country would expropriate anyamount of
foreign capital. Investors will then find no amount of investmentworth-
while sothat KK.
The country is small in the international economy facing a gross rate
of return on capital, r ,anda managerial reward, s ,givenby world markets.
Foreign investors borrow investment funds from the world capitalmarket at
cost (r —1)and must repay the principal plus income whether or not—8—
expropriation occurs.
Profits of foreign investors if expropriation does notoccur (11N) are
(2.2a) 11NF(K,N,) — — r(K- — s(H—ii)
Here denotes payment to the host country, its national income, if
expropriation does not occur. If expropriation doesoccur, foreign mana-
gerial services are withdrawn, are no longer employed and need not bepaid.
Further, no payments need be made to host country factors. However, firms
must still pay foreign lenders the value of their capital plus income.Thus,
if expropriation occurs, the foreign investors receiveprofits (]1E) of
(2,2b) 11E =—r(K—i)
If expropriation occurs, the host country takes over allproduction of
of Q,3 and receives national income (yE) of
(2.3) E F(K,H,)
Expropriation is optimal if >Nand not otherwise. The borderline
condition =Edefines a relationship between and K via (2.3)
which we name the EE curve. For a given
,investmentin excess of the






Inthe absence of expropriation profits are 11N given by (2.2a). We
assume that competition among potential investors guaranteesFE =sand
that is such that
(2.5)—9—
We discuss how the host country might extract below. EquatIon (2.5)






where H is given by
(2.6) F(K,Ii,i:) =S
Wedefine K as the level of K such that
(2.7) FK(,H,L)
r
i.e., the level of K that would obtain under perfect capitaland managerial
mobility with no threat of expropriation. On the usual assumptionthat
FF —F2
>0,theII curve is upward sloping for K c K and downward
sloping for K >K
The EE and II curves are illustrated in Figure 2.1. All points below
the EE curve represent situations of expropriation. If these curves inter-
sect only to the left of ,the!E curve lies everywhere about the II curve
for K > and no foreign investment is possible. Any investment would be
expropriated. If the EE curve intersects the II curve anywhere tothe right
of ,thenthe country obtains maximum income of since the point
(IC,) liesabove the EE curve. In this case the expropriation constraint
is not binding. An example of this situation is given by an F( )whichis
Cobb Douglas and an ii0.Inthis case, Y 0 since output cannot be
produced without U
If the EE curve cuts the II curve betweeniand but not to the—10--
right of K then the expropriation constraint is binding. Equilibrium is
determined at a point such as (K, N) It is possible that the EE curve
cuts the II curve more than once between and K with no intersection
to the right of K In this case we assume that the host obtains the
highest possible income. At this point the EE curve cuts the II curve
from below.4 Thus, at an equilibrium where the expropriation constraint




The remainder of this section focuses on this type of equilibrium.
When the threat of expropriation is binding, K <Kas given by (2.7)
and the marginal product of capital exceeds the world interest rate, r
Thus if all domestic factors are paid their marginal products, foreign
managers are paid their marginal product and foreign capital is paid r ,
Euler'stheorem implies that the value of total output will exceed the sum
of factor payments by a wedge (FK(K,ñ,L) —r)(K— .Weassume that
because of competition among potential investors this wedge accrues to the
host country.
There are a number of mechanisms whereby the host country could extract
this wedge. One would be the imposition of a luinp—swn tax on foreign
investors in this amount. Such a tax would allow the host country to
maximize the benefits from foreign investment given that it cannot foreswear
expropriation. An equivalent tax would be a tax on capital (tK*) such that—11-.
(1 —t)FK(K,Ü,1)
=rat the point where the EE and ii curves intersect. 6
Taxes on foreign capital in LDC's are in fact quite common and can be
justified if foreign investment is already constrained by the threat of
expropriation.
Maintaining the assumption that the host country does receive the rent
on foreign investment, we now analyse the effects of changes in various
exogenous variables on the equilibrium level of investment and on national
income when the threat of expropriation is binding.
First consider an Increase in K ,thesupply of nationally—owned
capital. This change shifts the II curve up by an amount r ,raisingthe
equilibrium levels of and K .Ifthe threat of expropriation were
not binding, K would remain at K while Y would rise by r .Whenthe
threat of expropriation determines K ,however,an increase in national
capital raises the total level of capital and raises national income by
morethan r
Anincreasein II shifts the II curve up by s and the EE curve up
by FH(K,il,L) >s.EquilibriumIncome rises byless than sand may even
fall.The levelof foreign investment falls. With more national managers
expropriation is, ceteris paribus, more desirable. This effect leads to a
reduction in foreign investment and in the total capital stock.
An increase in shifts the II curve up by FL(K,ñ,i) and the EE
curve up by FL(K,i,t). Since at equilibrium ui > ,incomerises by more
or less than FL(K,fi,t) and foreign investment rises or falls as FLH 0
If labor and managers are complements an increase in iincreasesthe benefit
accruing to the host from the presence of foreign managers and reduces the
incentive to expropriate.
An increase In r has no effect on the EE curve but shifts the II curve—12—
down by (KK) The equilibrium level of K falls, as does the equilibrium
level of which falls by more than K —, theamount by which falls.
An increase ins has no effect on the EE curve (at the equilibrium
point) but shifts the II curve down by H —.Againthe equilibrium level
of K falls, as does the equilibium level of ,whichfalls by more
than H i, theamount by which falls.
When the threat of expropriation is binding, increases inthe inter—
national prices of imported factors have a larger negativeeffect on national
income than otherwise. The reason is that, at higher pricesof these factors,
only a lower level of compensation of national factorsis compatible with
competitive equilibrium. At a given level of foreign investment, expro-
priation would be optimal. Hence foreign investmentis reduced.
If a penalty (P >0)is imposed In case of expropriation equation (2.3)
can be modified to
(2.3') E F(K,H) —p
An increase in P leaves the II curve unchanged butshifts the EE curve
down, increasing foreign investment and nationalincome. Thus a penalty
for expropriation can make a capital importer betteroff.
Finally we note the distributional consequencesof the threat of expro-
priation. For analytic simplicity we assumethat the tax implicit in a
binding threat of expropriation accrues tothe government while the three
national factors earn their marginal products. In relationto a situation
of perfect capital mobility, capital gains (by (FK(K,H,L)
—r))while
labor loses. National managers earn s independentof the level of foreign
investment and are unaffected. In Section 7,where we present a model where
the act of expropriation can actually occur, wediscuss the effects of an
expropriation itself on the distributionof income among factors.—13—
3. Implications for Project Evaluation
In the previous section, national factor supplies ,Land ,were
exogenous. From a longer—run perspective, however, the supplies of capital
and managerial services are determined by national decisions to invest in
physical and human capital. In this section we use the model to examine
the plications of expropriation for optimal investment strategies.
The model implicitly determines national income, Y ,interms of the
national endowments of factors so that we may write Y = .Consider
a two—period decision. In the first period resources are allocated toward
producing physical and human capital. The economy initially has a work
force of size N and training for management requires withdrawal from he
labor force for one period, denoted period 0 .Consumptionin the f rst
period is therefore
(3.1) c0=i(—il)—i
whereI is the period 0 production function for commodities. Preferences
are a function of period 0 consumption and period 1 natior.al income, U(C0,Y).
Then U and K will be chosen so that
(3.2) —U1 + UY =0
(3.3) —U11' + U2Y 0
At an expropriation—constrained equilibrium described by (2.8) and the
EE and II curves
(3.4) y— E (F(K,ii,1) —r)[ —
T ]+ r K dK K FK(K,H,L) + r —
FK(K)H,L)—14—
dY dK
(3.5)Y- —(F. (K,H,L)—r)—+ s
dli dli
Consider first the social return to national capital, Y .From(2.8a),
at an equilibrium, the coefficient of FK(K,R,L) —ris positive. Thus,
since FK(K,H,L)r >0,thesocial return to national capital exceeds
the world interest rate r Furthermore, if managers and capital are
complements, FK(K,H,L) <F(K,H,L) in this case Y >FK(K,H,L); i.e.,
the social return to national capital exceeds its marginal physical product.
Conversely,if K and B are substitutes, FK(K,H,L) >FJ<(K,N,L)
and the
return to capital lies between the domestic marginal physical productand
theworld interest rate. In the first caseIncreasing the capital stock
increases the productivity of managers, thereby reducing the incentive to
expropriate. Conversely in the second case.
Anincrease in the supply of national managerial services, onthe other
hand, increases income by less than the world reward to managerialservices,
s ,whichequals the domestic marginal product of managerial services. By
reducing reliance on foreign managerial services, an increasein H reduces
the availability of foreign capital. This effect may operate tothe extent
thatY
<0
Insumm ary, wh en the threatoopriatiiifld intls opt imal
decisions. As long as capital and managers are tomplementsboth rules tend
to understate the marginal social product of capitaland to overstate the
marginal social product of managers.—15—
4. Investment by Monopolistic Investors
In Section 2 we assumed that investors were perfectly competitive in
that the host country could extract a payment that drove profits to zero.
Facing a large number of potential investors, the host would only accept
investment projects yielding zero profits to the investor. We now turn to
the case in which the foreign investor is a monopolist vis—a—vis a large
number of host countries, but remains competitive in world markets for
capital and managerial services.8 The threat of expropriation nevertheless
exists.
As before, if the host country expropriates, it earns an income of
=F(K,H,L).Themonopolistic Investor must pay the host country at
least this amount to preclude expropriation, but has no reason to pay more.
Thus profits are given by
(4.1) =F(K,H,L)—F(K,fl,t)—r(K—i) — s(H—ii)









For the second—order condition to be satisfied we require that F(K,H,1) —
F(K,H,L)
<0,i.e.,FK <0.Ifit is not satisfied anywhere, then
K =Kand no foreign investment occurs. As in the competitive case, the
foreign investor equates the marginal product of managerial services to the
world salary but maintains a domestic product of capital in excess of the
world interest rate.




as an alternative expression for profits. Monopoly profits are the differ-
ence between national factor incomes at actual marginal productivities and
the marginal productivities that would obtain if expropriation were to occur.
Consider again a penalty P that the host country would suffer if it
should expropriate. In this case the host country will receive only
=F(K,H,L)-p
in the event of expropriation. Note that the same K is chosen by the
monopolist since P does not alter the first order conditions (4.2) and
(4.3), However, the investor need only pay the amount to preclude
expropriation. The existenceofthe penalty increasesmonopoly profitsand
reduces national income even though expropriation does not take place, in
contrast with the competitive case, where the penalty raises national income.
Given the production function F( )• themonopolist will always invest
less than competitive investors. When (4.2) is satisfied, (4.1) is positive.
Since <0for values of K greater than the level of monopoly invest-
ment, the level of K which satisfies TI =0is greater than the level
that satisfies 0—17—
5. Potential Expropriation and the Distortion of Technology
In Section 2 the threat of expropriation was shown to imply a distortion
in factor use. Too little capital was invested by foreigners so that the
economy's capital—labor ratio (K/L) was below the unconstrained optimum.
Other forms of distortion may be consequences of a threat of expropriation.
For instance, Magee (1977) discusses expenditures foreign investors may make
to conceal the nature of their production process.
A very general formulation of this notion is to assume that the firm's
profit in the absence of expropriation is given by
(5.1) =F(K,H,L,y)—s(H—fi)—r(K—i)—C(K,H,1,y)—
wherey is a parameter of the production function and C(s) is the cost over
and above any effect on F( )ofchoosing a particular value of y. Increases
in y increase C, i.e., C/y >0.In the event of expropriation, national
income is
(5.2) =J(K,H,L,y)
where J(.) is the country's production function after expropriation.9
Once the possibility of distorting technology is introduced, two
conclusions from the previous analysis need not obtain. First,
the level of investment occurring in competitive equilibrium under a
threat of expropriation may exceed that obtaining under perfect
capital mobility. Second, a monopolistic investor may invest more than
the competitive equilibrium level of capital.
To establish these propositions we define
(5.3) G(K,y)F(K,H,L,y) —C(K,H,t,y)—s(ii-H)—18—
where, since U is mobile exj, B is defined implicitly by FECR —s=0.
For simplicity we consider a technology in which y assumes a value of either
O or 1, and assume that G(K,0) >G(K,l)for all K. -
Inthe absence of an expropriation option, competitive investors will




where we suppress the constantsandin J( ),investmentat a level
would lead to expropriation. If y0 investment would occur only until
* *
K <K
where K0 satisfies (5.4) with equality.






then, by choosing y 1 and investing K1, competitiveinvestors can provide
the host country a higher national income than by choosing y=0and invest-
ing K .If,instead, the first inequality of (5.5) is not satisfied,in-




competitive investors can still provide the host country a higherincome by
*
choosingy1 and rationing investment at K1 Nothing precludes the possi-
bility that K1 > orthat K >K0
.Inthese cases more capital is installed
because the threat of expropriation is binding when the first best (y=0)is
used. This possibIlity requires, however, that(5.8) GK(K,l) >C(K0)
i.e., that the distortion of technology augment the marginal productof
capital to the investor.
To establish the second proposition assume that, in fact, J(K ,0)>
J(K
,1).In this case, under competition, there will be no distortionof
technology and y will equal 0.If, instead, there is a single monopolistic
investor his profits will be
(5.9) max [G(KTh ,y) J(KTh ,y)—r(Km
y=O,l
where is defined implicitly by the condition:
(5.10) GK(K,Y) JK(1c —r 0 ,y0,1
If J(K,0) >>J(K,l),then (5.9) is likely to be attained at y =1.If,
again, cK(K,l) >G(K,O)
while, in addition, JK(K,l) <K'0'
then
>ispossible. The monopolist may find that, bydistorting his
technology in a way that increases the marginal productof capital to him,
he reduces the usefulness of his capital stock to a potentialexpropriator,
thereby reducing required compensation to thehost country. Because the
marginal product of capital is greater withthis distortion, he invests
more than competitive investors who, in this case,do not install a distorted
technology.
The distortion of technology, in terms of itseffects on the welfare of
the host country, is analogous to an increasein the penalty P incumbent on
the host in the event of default. When potentialinvestors are competitive,
the host country benefits from the abilityof investors to distort technology.
The ability of a monopolistic investor to distorttechnology, however, acts
to the host country's detriment.—20—
6.Optimal Investment In
In Sections 2 to 5 foreign investment was riskiess. Frequently, however,
foreign investors engage in risky activities bearing muchof this risk. In
expropriating such activities the host assumes the riskinherent in these
activities.
We assume that domestic production (Q)isgiven by the function
(6.1) QOF(K,L)
0 is a random variable; in this section we abstract frommanagerial services.
National endowments of capital and labor are K and L .Capitalis mobile
across borders before the investment takes placewhile labor is not. Capital
is in place at the time 0 is known and cannot be withdrawn.Expropriation
must also be chosen before the true value of 0is known.Investorsare cotn—
petitive and either risk neutral or considerthe risk completely diversifiable.
In the absence of expropriation, host income is regardless of o
Ifexpropriation occurs, national income(NE) depends on 0
(6.2) E eF(K,L)
Expropriation will be optimal ifE[U(YE)] exceeds U(YN) and not other-
wise where U(•) is the host's utility of income.Since E[U(YE)) increases
in K ,thecondition
(6.3) E[L1(YE))U(YN)
implicitlydefines a level of K ,denotedK*(YN) such that K >K*irplies
that expropriation is optimal and not otherwise.Note that K*t(YN) >0
If expropriation occurs foreign investorswill earn profits of
(6.4) E —r(K ——21—
assuming,as before, that foreign sources of capital must be paid regardless.
If expropriation does not occur then profits are
(6.5) OF(K,L) -r(K--
Firmsmaximize expected profits. If K is less thanK* then invest-
ment occurs until
(6.6) E[OFK(K,) —r]0
Denote K by the level of K satisfying (6.6).
Competition among investors and taxation of the typediscussed in
Section 2 will raise to the point where
(6.7) E[OF(K,L) -- r(K)1=
Denotethe level of satisfying (6.7) at K K by .IfK <
thenK defines an equilibrium level of total investment and an equilibrium
level of national income. At this equilibrium the threat of expropriationis
not binding. If however K >K*(YN)investment at a level of K will lead to
expropriation and the equilibrium level of investmentvii]. be constrained.
We depict the resulting equilibriim in Figure 6.1. Valuesof K and
consistent with competition in international capital markets, i.e.,satisfy-
ing (6.7), are illustrated by the curve II.Values satisfying the no
expropriation condition with strict equality, i.e.,
(6.8) E{U[OF(K,t)1}U(YN)
are illustrated by the curveEE.
The slope of II is given by
(69)g— E(eFK
—r) II—22—
positive for K <Kandnegativefor K >C.Thusthe II curve achieves






The expected output if no investment occurs is
(6.11) EE(0)F(K,L)
This is the amount foreign investors are willing to pay to produce in the
host country without investing any foreign capital. We define by the
relationship
(6.12) E{u[er(K,Lfl} u()
i.e., is the amount investors must pay the host for the right to use
domestic factors if they make no investment themselves.
If U is concave then .Inthis case the EE and II curves
will cross to the right of K ,i.e.,there will exist one equilibrium cotn—
patible with: (1) competitive international capital markets,(2) no expro-
priation and (3) a positive level of foreign investment.Thus if the host
is risk averse while investors are risk neutral, some Investmentwill occur.
If the EE and II curves cross to the right of K the equilibriumwill be
characterized by and and the threat of expropriation is not binding.
If the curves cross only to the left of K the competitive equilibriumlevels
of K and Y are constrained by the threat of expropriation.If the EE
curve cuts the II curve more than once, we assume, as before,that the equl—
librium with the highest obtains. We next determine the effects of
increases in risk and in E(O) ,,L andr on the equilibrium levels of
K and Y when the EE curve cuts the II curve from belowand the threat of
expropriation is binding (K <—23—
First, if output becomes more uncertain, a risk averse host country is
less willing to expropriate. A lower level of compensation is required
to forestall expropriation of a given capital stock. The EE curve shifts
down. Risk neutral investors do not require a higher expected return, so
the II curve does not shift. The equilibrium values of and K rise.
Paradoxically, then, an increase in the riskiness of investment can actually
increase national income and national welfare by reducing the incentive to
expropriate and attracting foreign investment.
Given K ,anincrease in E(O) shifts both the EE and II curves up by an
amount F .Income,but not the level of foreign investment, rises.
An increase in L shifts the II curve up by an amount
(6.13) =E(O)F
dL L
and the EE curve by
dYN E(U'OFL) COV(u',eFL)
(6.14) ——— = = E(e)F1+ C(TTI
dLEE £U)
Ifthe host country is risk averse U' is a decreasing function of 0 and
the second term in the far right version of (6.14) is negative. Hence the
II curve shifts up by more than the EE curve. rises by more than E(O)FL
and foreign investment rises. Because an increase in L raises the riskiness
as well as the level of output the host country is able to accept more capital.
An increase in K or a reduction in r continues to increase income.
As in the certainty mod1, this effect is larger when the threat of expro-
priation is binding relative to a situation of perfect capital mobility.—24
7.Investment with Stochastic Expropriation
In previous sections we have presented models in which expropriation
never actually occurs. In a deterministic context, or in a context in which
the expropriation decision must occur before any randomness is resolved, ex-
propriation can be predicted exactly, and rational, fully—informed investors
will not make investments that will be expropriated. If, however, some
random process affecting the desirability of expropriation is resolved between
the time of the investment and the expropriation decision, investments may be
expropriated. Investors make such investments accepting this risk.
Although the investigation of a model with stochastic expropriation is
considerably more difficult than the preceding analysis it is crucially
important to an understanding of theexpropriationissue. To illustrate this
phenomenon, consider again the model developed in section 2, but assume that
the supply of national managers, Ti, isgiven by a function H(S) increasing
in 9 ,where0 is a random variable uniformly distributed on (0,1). S is
not known when investment takes place but is revealed before the expropriation
decision, A number of other variables could be random. Introducing uncertain-
ty in the supply of national managers provides one simple means of illustrating
some aspects of stochastic expropriation.
National income, if expropriation does not take place, is given by
(7.1) YN(O) =r+ wf + sTi(e) =F(K,}1,L)—
FK(K
— — s(H—Ti)
whererd is the interest rate paid national capital, w the wage and other
variables are defined in section 2, The third part of equation (7.1) follows
from Euler's theorem and our assumption that national factors receive their
marginal products. In contrast to the deterministic case, such payments will
exhaust product, as we show below. The profits of foreign firms, if—25—
expropriation does not occur, are, as before,
(7.2)
In the event of expropriation, however, national income becomes
(73) E(0) =G(K,i(o),ñ,t)
where
(7.4) C(K,fi(O),N,L)max[F(K,li(e),L), F(K,R,L) + s(B —
sinceit is now possible that Ce)> Bfor high values of 0 .Thispossi-
bility of the host exporting managerial services wasruledOut in the deter-
ministic model of section 2. Profits are simply, as before,
(75) E =-r(K-
Expropriationbecomes optimal, then, when >.1Nand not otherwise.








i.e., as 0 rises, expropriation becomes more desirable.
The value 0* is defined by the condition
(7.8) yN(0*) yE(0*)
or 0* 0 if E(0) >yN(0)or e1if N(1)>yE(1)
Expected profits are given by
(7.9) E(fl)0*[F(K,B,L) —r—sf1—w]—r(K—)We assume that investors are atomistic, and take not only r and s,
but rd, v and O as given; individual investors invest too little to consider
their investments to affect national factor prices or the probability of expro-.
priation. Competition among investors implies zero expected profits
(7.lOa)E(fl) =0
This condition, along with the assumption that national factors and foreign
managers are paid their marginal products and Euler's theorem, implies that
(7.lOb) 0*FKr =0 (if K >0).
But this result is equivalent to the first order condition of ECu) with
respect to K. In a situation of stochastic expropriation, the host need not
*
imposea tax of tK to ensure zero expected profits —theprobability of ex-
propriation, (10*), plays an analogous role.
Together (7.8) and (7.lOa), along with r, s, i and L, determine equi—
librium values of K, H and 0.
Using F11 =sto determine H implicitly and substituting into (7.8)and
(7.lOb)we obtain two equations in two unknowns, 0* and K. Relationship (7.1Gb)
gives values of K and O consistent with zero profits. We denote this locus
the II curve. If 0* C(0,1)the II curve has slope.
dO* _0*(FF —F,)
(7.11) 'F F II KHH
If F is a well—behaved production function, the principal minors alternate
in sign and FF >F
,implyingthat the II curve slopes upward. An in-
crease !n increases the expected return on capital, increasing K. The II
curve is drawn in figure 7,1. At0*0 expropriation is almost certain
and KK; no foreign investment takes place. At the other extreme, if
1 expropriation is almost certain not to occur, and K =K,where—27—
FK(K,H,L) =r
defines the equilibrium value of K.
Relationship (7.8) defines 0* as another function of K and exogenous
variables. We call it the EE curve. It has slope
(7.12) =FGK+ (FF —F)(K-)
EE F(s_CH)H'
which is ambiguous in sign.Theambiguity arises because an increase
in K raises income whether expropriation occurs or not.
In general we cannot say In which state income rises more.
Because of this ambiguity equilibria with higher levels of foreign investment
may, ceteris paribus, be associated with a lower probability of expropriation.
Whatever the slope of the EE curve, however, it lies completely to the
right of K for 0* <1;at K =K, >forall values of 0.If K =, the
host country gains no capital by expropriating but loses its ability to
import managerial services. Consequently the threat of expropriation never
prohibits foreign investment entirely.
The EE and II curves may cross several times as illustrated in Figure 7.1.
Because 0* tends to zero as K tends to infinity, the last intersection of
these two curves must have the EE curve cutting the II curve from above.
The expected value of the host's income, E[Y(0)], is given by
(7.13) E(Y) =e*N + flyE(o)do






i.e.,E(Y) increases along the II curve. We assume, as before, that the—28—
host country ensures that the highest intersection of the EE and the II
curves is chosen.
The local effects of increases in K ,L,E(H),r and s -are deter-
mined by the effect of these changes on the positions of the II and EE curves:
First consider an increase in K .TheII curve is unaffected while the
EE curve shifts up. The equilibrium levels of 0* and K rise; i.e., total
investment rises and the probability of default declines. As in the preceding
models, national capital does not crowd out foreign capital one—for—one.
Secondly, if L increases the II curve shifts down (which followsfrom
Euler's theorem applied to the marginal products of a constant return to
scale production function) while the direction of the shift in the EE curve
is ambiguous. Consequently 0* and K may rise or fall.
Thirdly, if the distribution of 0 changes to dominate the originalin
the first—order sense, i.e., if larger numbers of domestic managersbecome
more probable, the II curve is unaffected while the EE curveshifts down.
Foreign investment falls and the probability of expropriation,1. —0,rises.
Fourth, an increase in r ,theworld interest rate, shifts the II curve
upward while the EE curve is unaffected, The levelof investment falls while
the probability of expropriation also falls if the EE curve slopes upbut
rises if it slopes down.
If s rises the EE curve shifts down while the shift in theII curve
is ambiguous. The effects on0* and K are therefore indeterminate.
Introducing an ex6genous penalty in amount P imposed bythe investor's





Ai increase in the penalty shifts the EE curveupwardso that the level of
investment, K ,riseswhile the probability of expropriation, 0*, falls.
As long as capital and managers are complementary factors the penalty
raises the income of the host country in any state of nature, even in states
where expropriation actually occurs and the penalty is imposed. First, in
any state in which expropriation does not occur, host country income rises,
as may be shown by differentiating the third part of (7.1) with respect to
K. In state 0 host country income is the same whether or not expropriation




As long as >0,ifGK(K,H(o),L) >1then GK 4> 1for all 0 >0*.
Thus, even in states where the penalty is imposed, the existence of the
penalty raises income: the positive, indirect effect of the penalty In rais—
lngthe level of the capital stock dominates the direct, negative effect
of the penalty.1°
In section 2 we discussed the implications of a binding threat of
expropriation on income distribution. We now consider the distributional
implications of expropriation itself.110f course the effect of expropriation
on income distribution depends upon how the income from the expropriated
capital is distributed among factors. If expropriation raises national
income as a whole this income can be distributed in a way which harms no
domestic factor. For analytic convenience, however, we will assume that
income accrues to a fourth party, perhaps the government.
First, note that if H(0) >Hwhen expropriation occurs only H managers
will be employed domestically. In this case expropriation does not affect
the domestic levels of factor use. Hence, for this case, the act of expro-
priation has no distributional effects since marginal products are unaffected.If, however, H(E) <H,only (O) managers will be available domestically
aLter an expropriation. Managers will gain, since they earn FH(X,H(E),L) >s=
.FH(K,H,L).Labor gains or loses as FLH0 while capital gains or loses as
F 0; that is, factors complementary with managerial services lose while
substitutes gain. Both capital and labor maylosefrom an expropriation but
both cannot gain.
To surmnarize, an increase in the probability of expropriation, if expro-
priation does not occur, tends to benefit national capital, harm labor and
leave national managers unaffected relative to a situation of perfect capital
mobility. If all factors are complements expropriation itself will either
leave all factors unaffected relative to a situation of no expropriation, or
harm capital and labor and benefit managers.
Throughout, we have related the expropriation decision to its effect
on national income or on the expected utility of national income. Authorities
controlling the expropriation decision may be motivated more by the effects
of expropriation on various sub—groups rather than on the economy as a whole.
An extension of our analysis would be a reformulation of the expropriation
criterion to account for these distributional preferences.—31-
8. Conclusion
-
Itis widely recognized that the threat of expropriation can create
partures from perfect capital mobility. This threat has usually, however,
been treated as an exogenous factor not susceptible of economic analysis.
In this paper we have developed a model of expropriation derived explicitly
from utility maximizing behavior on the part of host countries and investors.
While our basic model is a simple one, in the tradition of neoclassical trade
theory, it yields a number of implications about the effects of expropriation
on the welfare of the host country, on the distribution of incomein the host
country, on the appropriate shadow pricing of factors of production,and on
the choice of technology in production. While we have explored a number of
variants of our model, for instance by introducing uncertainty of two quite
different forms, several basic points emerge, The threat of expropriation is
detrimental to the welfare of a host country facing competitive foreign
investors; domestic capitalists benefit from the threat of expropriationwhile
the effect on labor is detrimental. Domestic managers are unaffected.If the
threat of expropriation constrains the level of foreign investment,domestic
marginal productivities understate the marginal social productof capital, if
capital and managers are complementary, and overstate the marginalsocial
product of managers.
The extent to which a host country is subject to a penalty if it should
expropriate actually enhances the welfare of a host country facing competitive
potential foreign investors when there is no uncertainty about expropriation.
This conclusion is reversed if a foreign investor is in a monopoly position
vis—a—vis the host country. If investors are competitive but it isuncertain
whether or not expropriation will occur at the time the investment is
made, the effect of an expropriation penalty maybe ambiguous. As long as—32-.
managers and capital are complements, however, the penalty raises host—
country Income in all states of nature, even those states in which expro—
priation occurs and the penalty is imposed.
Ourtheoryhas a number of implications for empirical research. First,
it provides a framework for predicting where deviations from perfect capital
mobility are most likely to emerge and suggests a number of testable hypo-
theses. For example, countries with high endowments of managerial skills
relative to physical capital are most likely to remain with a high marginal
physical product of capital. Secondly, the stochastic model we develop in
Section 7 provides a structure for estimating expropriation probabilities in
different countries. Thirdly, our model suggests a number of characteristics
of technology and factor employment which might be observed as a consequence
of a threat of expropriation. For instance, our model suggests explanations
for observed differences in technologies used by foreign and domestic firms
In the same country.—33—
NOTES
1. For instance, Williams (1975) and Jodice (1980) report evidencesuggesting
that expropriation Is particularly frequent in the banking sector and
that manufacturing Investments are less vulnerable than mining investments.
2. We assume that in the event of expropriation any asset abroad of the host
country will be seized in retaliation. The benefits of expropriation thus
depend only upon the net capital position.
3. This assumption is justified if each firmisa ininature of the economy
(constant returns), if a firmalwaysapplies the maximum penalty when
any of its capital is seized and if factors are immobile among firms
after the decision to invest. In this case the host expropriated all
the capital of all foreign firms if it expropiates anything at all. If
the second condition is not met consideration should be given toone
type of partial expropriation —atakeover of some of each firm's
capital. On this point see footnote 7 below.
If the third condition is not met, the possibility of a secondtype of
partial expropriation arises —thecomplete takeover of some, but not
all, firms. In this case, a country might lose access to only thepro-
portion of H—li corresponding to the proportion of firms expropriated.
The host could then re—allocate some of the H to these investments from
the investments It did not expropriate. The initial level of foreign
investment would have to be such as to prevent this strategy from being
optimal for the country since no firmwouldwant to be among the expro-
priated. A modified version of the EE curve discussed below would be
defined by this condition. A model of this second type of partial—34
expropriation is similar in conception and results to the model of total
expropriation discussed here, but is somewhat more complicated to present.
4. Contrasting the equilibrium where the expropriation threat is binding
with the unconstrained equilibrium, note that the capital—labor ratio is
lower in the first situation while the relative magnitude of H/L is
higher if capital and management are substitutes but lower if they are
complements. Thus, given a production function, the threat of expropriation
distorts factor hiring decisions. In Section 5 we discuss how the threat
of expropriation may cause firms to modify the production function itself.
Forsyth and Solomon (1977) sumnarize the evidence on differences in factor
proportions by nationality of investor. There appears to be no overall
tendency for foreign investors to employ different factor proportions than
domestic investors. Wide disparities in either direction exist, however,
in specific industries. It would be of interest to know if those industries
where the risk of expropriation is ceteris paribus greater exhibit rela-
tively labor intensive production by foreign firms.
5. Note that the left—hand side of (2,8a) is the marginal product of capital
holding the em nt of manaers constantat the national endowment
level, H .Thefirst term on the right—hand side is the marginal product
of capital dineotofmanagers at the optimal level when
managers are internationally mobile, H,Sincewe assume H >H,the
firstmarginal product is greater or less than the second as F 0
6. If we had made the alternative assumption that the wedge (FK —r)(K—K)
accrued to investorsratherthan to the host country, our results would
beparallel but not identical. The EE curve would remain the same while
therelationship—35—
FKK + FLt + sfl
would define national income and replace the II curve. Denoting this
equation the II' curve, note that it lies below the II curve. Thus if
foreign investors receive the rent associated with the threat of expro-
priation, the equilibrium level of investment and national income will be
lower than in the case we consider. If this line of thought is to be
pursued, a theory is needed to explain how the right to invest is rationed
among competing potential foreign investors. We find it more realistic,
however, to assume that host countries are able to exploit their position
vis—a—vis competitive investors and capture the rents associated with
foreign investment. Note that a tax on foreign investment income at rate
maximizes not only national income but the level of foreign investment
as well. In the range between 0 and t an increase in the tax rate
on foreign capital income tK actually summons more foreign capital: as
tK rises in this range so do the benefits to the host country of not
expropriating. Thus foreign investors can invest more without suffering
expropriation.
7. Taxation of foreign capital often takes the form of a requirement that
a national of the host country receive a share in the equity of a foreign
investment without providing a commensurate share of funds. The host
country may not necessarily obtain this transfer via legal means. It
may also be effected via bribes, a form of illegal taxation. Foreign
investors do, apparently, frequently pay bribes to host country officials
for the right to invest.
Taxation may even take the form of an anticipated expropriation that—36--
allows the investor to earn a competitive return on an investment either
because the expropriation is partial or because it occurs at a later date
(in a multi-period context). Firms invest knowing that time—consistent
behavior by the host leads to either of these results. The situation may
be explained by the concept of the obsolescing bargain; both parties enter
into an agreement anticipating that a shift in their relative strengths
will lead to a subsequent renegotiation. Such situations arise and do not
imply irrational behavior by investors. Our paper considers an expropria-
tion to render an investment regrettable from the investor's viewpoint
(i.e. to lead to a return less than the market return). Our analysis
also indicates, however, how the threat of the type of expropriation we
do consider makes other forms of (partial) expropriation appropriate as
optimal time—consistent taxes.
8. An alternative assumption is that one investor faces one host leading to
a Cournot—Nash or similar game theoretic analysis, a topic which we leave
to possible future analysis.
For instance, F( )mightbe a three factor production function with
ex ante elasticity of substitution a assumed constant and common between
all pairs of factors. The parameter y ,0 ya might be the chosen
ex post elasticity of substitution. In this case, would not enter
F( ).IfC(a) 0 ,y=awould be chosen under most circumstances.
However, with potential expropriation it may be optimal for the host if
firms choose y <aat cost CCy) >0.Thisoutcome is preferred
because can be raised by the additional deterrent provided by the
ex post inflexibility of technology.—37—
10. Whenmanagersand capital are substitutes(F <0),the possibility
arises that in some states in which il(O)> , theincrease in K
resulting from the imposition of the penalty does not overcome the
negative effect of the penalty itself on income. Because thepenalty
reduces host—country income in these states ofnature, we cannot rule
out the possibility that expected host country income fallsas a result
of a penalty.
].]Tobin(1974) also considers the distributional consequences of an act
of expropriation. Since he assumes a linear technology andan arbitrary
number of factors, his results diUer somewKat.REFERENCES
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